In this paper we present a family of measures aimed at determining the amount of inconsistency in probabilistic knowledge bases. Our approach to measuring inconsistency is graded in the sense that we consider minimal adjustments in the degrees of uncertainty (i.e., probabilities in this paper) of the statements necessary to make the knowledge base consistent. The computation of the family of measures we present here, in as much as it yields an adjustment in the probability of each statement that restores consistency, provides the modeler with possible repairs of the knowledge base. The case example that motivates our work and on which we test our approach is the knowledge base of CADIAG-2, a well known medical expert system.
Introduction
In the last few years the amount of literature dealing with aspects of inconsistency in knowledge bases has grown considerably and has become central in the field of databases and knowledge-based systems. In this paper we focus primarily on two aspects of inconsistency in probabilistic knowledge bases: the evaluation of inconsistency and possible repair strategies in the presence of inconsistency.
The evaluation of inconsistency in a database helps us understand it better. In particular, a measure of inconsistency allows us to determine how reliable the information contained in a database is and how this information could be used (for example, for inferential purposes) and even modified or adjusted to meet consistency. In this paper we present a family of measures aimed at quantifying the amount of inconsistency in probabilistic knowledge bases. Each measure in the family that we present here quantifies the amount of inconsistency by determining how far the knowledge base is from consistency based on a notion of distance given by a particular p-norm (which we call p-distance). This approach to quantifying inconsistency connects to possible repairs of the knowledge base in the sense that the computation of these measures yields an adjustment in the probability assignments that makes the knowledge base consistent.
Our approach to dealing with inconsistency is thus graded in the sense that we take into account the amount of adjustment of the degrees of uncertainty (i.e., probabilities) in the knowledge base. Alternative, non-graded approaches to measuring inconsistency in databases (not particularly defined for probabilistic databases) there are several. Among the most popular we have those based on the number and composition of the minimal inconsistent subsets contained in the database (see [9] or [10] ). In connection with these approaches to evaluating inconsistency we have repair strategies based on the removal of statements that occur in minimal inconsistent subsets of the database (see for example [6] , [11] or [16] for repair strategies of this nature). Graded approaches to quantify inconsistency in probabilistic knowledge bases we know only [17] and, as will be made clear later, is essentially different to ours.
Our case example throughout the paper will be a coded version of a fragment of the knowledge base of CADIAG-2 (Computer Assisted DIAGnosis), a well known rule-based expert system aimed at providing support in diagnostic decision making in the field of internal medicine. In fact, the work presented in this paper is mostly motivated by CADIAG-2.
As will be explained later in more detail the knowledge base of CADIAG-2 can be regarded, at least for consistency-checking and evaluation purposes, as probabilistic. An assumption that we believe to be implicit in CADIAG-2 and in most (if not all) probabilistic databases is the fact that the probabilities of the conditioning events in probabilistic conditional statements be strictly greater than zero. By assuming such fact we are excluding the possibility that a probability function satisfy 1 a conditional statement unless it assigns a probability strictly greater than zero to its conditioning event. In a large number of papers that deal with topics related to probabilistic satisfiability such an assumption is not taken (for example, in [17] ).
Our paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we introduce most of the notation we will be using throughout the paper and some preliminary definitions. In Section 3 we briefly describe the relevant features of the binary fragment of the knowledge base of CADIAG-2 that we will be using as our case example. Section 4 introduces and studies the family of measures of inconsistency announced above. In Section 5 we deal with some aspects of the computation of the inconsistency measures presented in Section 4 for the general case and, in Section 6, we focus on our case example and we measure the amount of inconsistency of the binary fragment of CADIAG-2's knowledge base by means of our inconsistency measures.
Preliminary definitions and notation
Throughout this paper we will be working with a finite propositional language L = {p 1 , ..., p l }, for some l ∈ N, and will denote by SL its closure under boolean connectives. Within the context of CADIAG-2 our language L will represent the set of medical entities occurring in the inference rules of the system. Such medical entities fall into two general types: symptoms, findings, signs and test results (to which we will commonly refer as symptoms) that form the subset S ⊂ L on the one hand and therapies and diseases (to which we will commonly refer as diseases) that form the subset D ⊂ L on the other.
We will use the symbols ⊥ and for classical contradiction and classical tautology respectively.
We say that ω is a probability function on L if the following two conditions hold, for all θ, φ ∈ SL:
• If |= θ then ω(θ) = 1.
We can restrict probability functions to the set [0, 1] ∩ Q. Such probability functions will be called rational.
A probability distribution ω on L can be characterized by the values it assigns to the expressions of the form ±p 1 ∧ ... ∧ ±p l , which we call states or worlds, where +p and −p stand for p and ¬p respectively. We denote the set of states in L by W , which we assume to be ordered in some way, and define W φ as follows, for φ ∈ SL:
Based on this characterization we can identify probability functions on L with 2 l -coordinate vectors in D 2 l , with
where the coordinate x i stands for the probability assigned to the state α i ∈ W . Sentences in SL can also be identified (up to semantical equivalence) with 2 l -coordinate vectors. For φ ∈ SL we can set the 2 l -coordinate vector r φ as follows: for each i ∈ {1, ..., 2 l } and α i ∈ W , r i φ = 1 if α i ∈ W φ and r i φ = 0 otherwise.
Let us set K = {φ|θ | φ, θ ∈ SL}, the set of conditional statements in SL. We define probability on conditional statements in SL from the notion of unconditional probability in the conventional way. For ω a probability function on L and φ|θ ∈ K,
We will denote the collection of closed intervals contained in [0, 1] by I. Intervals of the form [η, η] ∈ I (i.e., real point values in the interval [0, 1]) will normally be denoted by η itself.
For the next definition let us consider ∆ ⊆ K.
Definition 2 An assignment v on ∆ is a map from ∆ to I.
The assignment v will be said to be point valued if v(φ|θ) ∈ [0, 1] for all φ|θ ∈ ∆.
We denote the set of assignments on ∆ by V ∆ and set
We will sometimes write [∆, v] ∈ PK in extended form; i.e., as
with Ω ∈ I or, more in keeping with the notation later employed for the rules of CADIAG-2, as { φ|θ, Ω | φ|θ ∈ ∆, v(φ|θ) = Ω}.
Let [∆, v] ∈ PK and ∆ ⊂ ∆. We denote by v |∆ the restriction of v on ∆ .
In that sense we say that [∆, v] In order to prove some results in this paper it will be useful to regard our language L as a collection of unary predicates or sets in a first-order language and SL the closure of predicates in L under boolean combinations. For the next (and last) two definitions of this section we will regard L as a set of unary predicates. 
3 The knowledge base of CADIAG-2
The medical expert system CADIAG-2 consists of two main components: the inference engine and the knowledge base. The inference engine is based on methods of approximate reasoning in fuzzy set theory, in the sense of [18] . Formalisations and analyses of it can be found in, for example, [7] or [15] . The knowledge base of the system consists of a set of IF-THEN rules intended to represent relationships between distinct medical entities. The vast majority of them are binary (i.e., they relate single medical entities) and only such rules are considered in our paper. The one that follows is an example of a binary rule of CADIAG-2 (taken from [3] ):
IF suspicion of liver metastases by liver palpation THEN pancreatic cancer with degree of confirmation 0.3
The degree of confirmation refers, intuitively, to the degree to which the antecedent (i.e., 'suspicion of liver metastases by liver palpation' in the example above) confirms the consequent (i.e., 'pancreatic cancer ' above). It is claimed in part of the literature on CADIAG-2, like for example in [1] , that such degrees of confirmation can be understood as probabilities and the rules themselves as probabilistic conditional statements. In most of the literature on CADIAG-2 though, like for example in [2] or [3] , an alternative, non-probabilistic interpretation for the degrees of confirmation is suggested. However, it is proved in [12] that the binary fragment of CADIAG-2's knowledge base is satisfiable in terms of the suggested non-probabilistic interpretation if and only if it is probabilistically satisfiable. Thus, at least for consistency-checking and evaluation purposes, one can regard CADIAG-2's binary knowledge base as probabilistic no matter which of these two possible interpretations is to be chosen.
We will represent binary rules in CADIAG-2 by pairs of the form q|p, η , with q|p ∈ K, p, q ∈ L and the degree of confirmation η ∈ [0, 1]. We will denote the set consisting of such rules by Φ CB ∈ PK.
We can classify rules in Φ CB into three different types: rules in which both antecedent (or, in probabilistic terms, conditioning event) and consequent (or conditioned event) are medical entities in S (symptom-symptom), rules in which both antecedent and consequent are medical entities in D (disease-disease) and those in which the antecedent is a medical entity in S and the consequent an entity in D (symptom-disease). 4 The degree of confirmation in a rule of the first two types is a value in the set {0, 1} and it is in this sense that we say that rules of these types are classical. Table 1 shows the composition of Φ CB : 
Measuring inconsistency: p-distance
Our approach to measuring inconsistency for knowledge bases of the form [∆, v] ∈ PK is based on the quantification of the minimal adjustment that one needs to make on v in order for [∆, v] to be satisfiable. Such an approach is similar in nature to that defined in [17] . The main difference between both approaches rests on the notion of satisfiability for probabilistic conditional statements: null probability for the conditioning event in a probabilistic statement is allowed in [17] and makes the statement satisfiable by default. Our approach becomes much more complex in comparison to [17] due mostly to our definition of satisfiability, which we believe is more natural and intuitive, and to a more general notion of minimal adjustments.
In order to quantify the minimal adjustment we will rely on the so-called p-norm which, for a vector x ∈ R m , is given by
for p ≥ 1 (not necessarily an integer). The most common p-norms are certainly those of order 1 and 2 (i.e., 1-norm and 2-norm). We also have
among the most common norms, which we will refer to as the ∞-norm and regard as a p-norm with p = ∞. In this context we will abuse notation slightly and will write [1, ∞] for the range of possible values for p.
Let ∈ * R be a non-zero infinitesimal in the set of hyperreal numbers. 5 We will be working with the set
The reason why we consider ∈ * R, although it should not come at a surprise given the notion of satisfiability we are working with, will be made clear below.
As is common, we will denote the standard (i.e., real) part of a finite number a ∈ A by st(a) (for more on hyperreal numbers and, in general, nonstandard analysis see for example [8] ).
We mention at this point that we are not interested in infinitesimal precision and thus we do not consider algebraic operations involving infinitesimals. The consideration of as an infinitesimal magnitude suffices for our purposes.
For what follows let [∆, v] ∈ PK and Γ ⊂ ∆, with
for some k ∈ N, and v(φ i |θ i ) = [η i , η i ] for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}. Γ is intended to represent the set of conditional statements in ∆ that are regarded as correctly evaluated by v and that should (arguably) not be considered when assessing the p-distance of [∆, v] .
We define [∆, v x ] to be the set
where x i , x i+k are positive real values satisfying the constraint
for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}. 5 That is to say, is such that 0 < < 1 n for all n ∈ N.
Definition 7
We define the real set
is bounded below for all p ∈ [1, ∞] and thus, if it is not empty, its infimum exists (i.e., inf(F
and the set given by the point-valued assignments u on ∆ for which [∆, u] is satisfiable. 
is satisfiable and define Λ to be the set of probability distributions on L that satisfy [Γ, v |Γ ] we have that each ω ∈ Λ with ω(θ i ) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., k} satisfies [∆, v x ] for some real values x i , with i ∈ {1, ..., 2k}, and thus, if any such probability distribution existed,
would not be empty. On the other hand, if there were no such probability distributions then F p Γ ([∆, v]) would be empty, in which case we would have DC
We will write
whenever there is no set Γ ⊂ ∆ with respect to which we are defining the p-distance of [∆, v] . 
For the next definition let x ∈ R 2k be a repair in
Definition 10 We say that x is p-optimal if
Properties of DC p
Throughout all this subsection let [∆, v] ∈ PK, with Γ ⊂ ∆ and
First of all notice that it is not generally true that DC
This is, as claimed earlier, a consequence of our notion of satisfiability and, more particularly, the requirement that a conditioning event in a conditional statement be assigned probability strictly greater than zero. To show this more clearly with an example, consider the subset [∆, v] given by the following set of rules in Φ CB :
It is clear that [∆, v] is unsatisfiable. Let us consider the sequence of probability functions {ω n } n∈N on {D36, D81, S157} characterized by the following assignments:
Let lim n→∞ ω n = ω. It can be easily shown that such assignments fully determine ω n and ω as probability functions on the language {D36, D81, S157}, for all n ∈ N.
We have that, for all n ∈ N, ω n (D36|S157) = 0.3, ω n (D81|S157) = 0.15 and ω n (D81|D36) = n−0.85 n−0.7 . It is clear that for any δ > 0 we can find N ∈ N such that, for all n > N , we have that
For the next result let us consider [
Proof. It follows directly from the definition of DC p .
For the next proposition let us assume that
) is continuous and decreasing on p, for p ∈ [1, ∞).
Proof. The result follows from the well known fact that, for general x ∈ R m and m ∈ N, x p is continuous and decreasing on p.
For the next results let p 1 , p 2 ∈ [1, ∞].
Proof
Proof. This result follows directly from the definition of DC p .
.., q k ∈ L, and Γ = ∅. First of all notice that q i |q i , q j |q j , for any i, j ∈ {1, ..., k} with i = j, are not equivalent in the sense that we can define a probability function ω on L such that ω(q i |q i ) = 1 but that assigns no probability to q j |q j by setting ω(q j ) = 0. It is clear that, for all p ∈ [1, ∞), we will have that DC
It is also clear that this is the biggest p-distance for a probabilistic database in PK given the premises.
Next we want to prove that DC p1 and DC p2 (for p 1 = p 2 ) are essentially distinct, by which we mean that the difference between DC p1 and DC p2 does not reduce only to the (possible) difference in magnitude of the values they assign to a certain knowledge base in PK but also to the ordering they induce on PK.
Proposition 17 DC
p1 and DC p2 induce distinct orderings on PK.
Proof. Let us assume that p 1 < p 2 and that
First notice that, for all λ ∈ (0, 1], it is the case that
Notice also that, since p 1 ∈ [1, ∞), there needs to exist λ ∈ [0, 1] such that
and thus such that
and
In
Normalized p-distance
In this subsection we introduce the notion of normalized p-distance. In order to do so let us consider [∆, v] ∈ PK, with Γ ⊂ ∆ and
The normalized ∞-distance of [∆, v] coincides with its ∞-distance:
The normalized p-distance gives us the ratio between the value DC Proof. The result follows from the fact that, for general x ∈ R m and m ∈ N,
is continuous and increasing on p.
For the next proposition let p 1 , p 2 ∈ [1, ∞].
Proof. Let us assume that 
., x p2 = t) but notice that, since
is increasing on p, we have that 
Examples and some remarks
In this subsection we consider some examples (the first two extracted from Φ CB ) in order to illustrate some diferences in DC p and the p-optimal repairs for distinct values of p. The values we will focus on are the most common when dealing with p-norms (i.e., 1, 2 and ∞).
Let us consider for our first example the set [∆, v] ⊂ Φ CB given by the rules
in Φ CB , with S668 ∈ S and D10, D25, D70 ∈ D. Let us assume that the rules D25|D10, 1 and D25|D70, 1 are believed to be accurate by the modeler and thus set Γ = {D25|D10, D25|D70}.
We will have that DC There is a unique 1-optimal repair in R Γ ([∆, v]) and it yields a unique modification in the assignment of the conditional statement D25|S668 by a magnitude of 0.7 (i.e., such optimal repair would consist of the replacement of D25|S668, 0.1 for D25|S668, [0.1, 0.8] ). Notice that, in such repair, the whole weight of the adjustment rests on a single statement in Φ CB and that, in the lack of knowledge of how reliable or accurate the assignment v is on the distinct statements in ∆ − Γ and in the lack of any other rationality criterion that allows us to discriminate among possible repairs, might not be the most reasonable repair strategy. Instead, the unique ∞-optimal repair in R Γ ([∆, v]) offers in that sense a more balanced approach by inducing an adjustment of magnitude 0.35 in the assignment on each one of the statements in ∆ − Γ. The unique 2-optimal repair in R Γ ([∆, v]) involves an adjustment of magnitude 7 15 in the assignment on the statement D25|S668 and an adjustment of magnitude 7 30 on both D10|S668 and D70|S668. This simple example favours the view that, in the lack of knowledge about the reliability of the statements in our knowledge base and in the lack of any other applicable rationality criterion, large values of p seem to be more adequate when it comes to considering p-optimal repairs for our knowledge base.
For our second example consider
with q 1 , ..., q k ∈ L distinct propositional variables, for k ∈ N. Here we will have that whenever k 1 < k 2 based on the simple fact that the former is bigger. On that assumption and in the view of examples like these in which the adjustment of possible optimal repairs of the knowledge base concentrates on a small number of statements it seems more reasonable to measure the p-distance to consistency by considering small values of p.
Computation of DC p and R
In this section we deal with some issues regarding the computation of DC p (and thus R) for a general knowledge base [∆, v] ∈ PK. In particular, we show the connection between its computation and the solution to certain constrained optimization problems.
Let us consider [∆, v], with ∆ = ∆
for some j ∈ {0} ∪ N and k ∈ N.
Consider the following constrained optimization problem with optimization variable the vector x ∈ R 2k :
subject to the following constraints:
• λ i r χi · y ≤ r ψi∧χi · y ≤ λ i r χi · y for each i ∈ {1, ..., j},
• r θ · y ≥ δ for each φ|θ ∈ ∆ for fixed δ ∈ (0, 1],
The value attained by the optimization variable x in (1) represents a possible repair of [∆, v] (i.e., an element in R Γ ([∆, v])) and the vector y a probability function on L. The value δ is introduced as a lower bound probability threshold for the conditioning events in the statements in ∆.
We define the constrained optimization problem (2) from (1) by replacing the constraint r θ · y ≥ δ for each φ|θ ∈ ∆ for fixed δ ∈ (0, 1], for the following strict inequality:
Let us denote the constrained optimization problems (1) and (2) 
, the solution to (1), as follows:
By ( x, y) being feasible we mean that ( x, y) satisfies the constraints in (1) . The collection of all such vectors is called the feasible set of (1) -see, for example, [5] for more on these concepts and, in general, on the terminology and basic definitions for constrained optimization problems-. Notice that SC p,δ
, with respect to the feasible set of (2), in an analogous way.
It is clear from the definition of F
and that an optimal point ( x, y) ∈ R 2k+2 l may not exist (i.e., a point ( x, y) at
, provided it exists, is attained). As is clear, x in an optimal point ( x, y) yields a p-optimal repair.
From now we will focus on C For what follows let us set C = {θ ∈ SL | φ|θ ∈ ∆} and define Π [Γ,v |Γ ] to be the set of probability functions on L that satisfy [Γ,
or just Π coincides with the set of probability functions on L).
Definition 21
We say that C is η-consistent with respect to [Γ, v |Γ ] if there exists a probability function ω ∈ Π [Γ,v |Γ ] such that ω(θ) ≥ η for all θ ∈ C.
Definition 22
We say that C is maximally η-consistent with respect to [Γ, v |Γ ] if these two conditions hold:
• For all λ < η we have that C is λ-consistent with respect to [Γ, v |Γ ].
• For all µ > η we have that C is not µ-consistent with respect to [Γ, v |Γ ].
These two definitions are generalizations of the notions of η-consistency and maximal η-consistency introduced in [13] as measures of consistency of classical propositional knowledge bases.
We will denote the maximal η-consistency of C with respect to our set [Γ, v |Γ ] by mc [Γ,v |Γ ] (C) -if Γ = ∅ then we will just write mc(C)-and will use the abbreviation ω(C) ≥ η to express the fact that
Let us assume now that C is maximally η-consistent with respect to [Γ, v |Γ ]. Notice that it is not generally the case that there exists a probability function ω ∈ Π [Γ,v |Γ ] such that ω(C) ≥ η. To see this consider the example where
and that there is no probability function ω ∈ Π [Γ,v |Γ ] such that ω(C) = 1. However, if Γ = ∅ then it is proved in [13] that mc(C) is a rational number and attained by some probability function ω on L.
Consider the following constrained optimization problem with optimization variable t ∈ R: maximize t subject to the following constraints:
• r φ · y ≥ t for each φ ∈ C,
• r χ · y > 0 for each ψ|χ ∈ Γ.
Notice that if Γ = ∅ then the problem above is a linear program. The solution to this problem, if it exists, yields mc [Γ,v |Γ ] (C):
Proof. First of all notice that, since mc [Γ,v |Γ ] (C) > 0, the feasible set of
follows from the fact that the feasible set is a closed set.
Notice that the vector x in an optimal point ( For the next proposition let us assume that mc [Γ,v |Γ ] (C) > 0. Consider {δ n } n∈N a decreasing sequence that converges to 0, with δ n ∈ (0, mc [Γ,v |Γ ] (C)) for all n ∈ N, and = lim
Proof. It follows trivially from the definition of the map DC p .
Notice that the constraint functions of the form [4] or [5] for more on these issues). Nevertheless, there exist methods to deal with at least small instances of these problems. Such methods normally take some compromise that could consist, for example, in a simplification of the problem by means of a modification in the constraints and/or the obtention of an approximation to the solution at best.
Measuring inconsistency in Φ CB
In the companion paper [12] it was shown that Φ CB is unsatisfiable. A study of the sources of inconsistency was also carried out and we found that, for a slightly relaxed version of Φ CB given by replacing every rule of the form p|q, η in it with η ∈ (0, 1) for p|q, [η − 0.01, η + 0.01] 7 the number of minimal unsatisfiable subsets is 695. These subsets happen to be also minimal unsatisfiable subsets of Φ CB itself (i.e., under the natural, point-valued interpretation for the rules). We actually know the number of minimal unsatisfiable subsets of Φ CB itself is much larger yet not all of them have been computed so far (we refer to [12] for more on these issues).
On a straightforward reading, one could claim that such a large number of minimal unsatisfiable subsets makes Φ CB highly inconsistent as each inconsistent subset is an inconsistency. Our notion of p-distance constitutes a graded approach to measuring inconsistency in probabilistic knowledge bases and gives a very different reading as to how inconsistent Φ CB is.
Measuring
The computation of DC p for a general knowledge base [∆, v] ∈ PK is, as we have seen in the previous section, not a trivial matter. In particular, in order to compute DC p (Φ CB ), we will use some heuristics and will take advantage of its simple structure, as we will shortly show.
Let [∆, v] ∈ PK be such that, for all φ|θ ∈ ∆, φ, θ ∈ L. We can regard [∆, v] as a directed graph where the edges and nodes are given by the conditional statements in ∆ (i.e., the conditional statement φ|θ yields the edge directed from the node θ to the node φ).
For what follows let us consider the collection of real intervals I r ⊂ I that differs from I in that the end points of its members are rational (i.e., for [η 1 , η 2 ] ∈ I r we will have that η 1 , η 2 ∈ Q).
For the next lemma let [∆, v] ∈ PK r , where Let us consider the following linear system with variables the 2 l coordinates of the vector y given by the collection of inequalities of the form η r θ · y ≤ r φ∧θ · y ≤ η r θ · y, for all φ|θ ∈ ∆, with v(φ|θ) = [η, η] ∈ I r . Along with these inequalities we also consider the constraints y ∈ D 2 l (i.e., y is a probability function on L) and r θ · y > 0 for each φ|θ ∈ ∆.
We assume that this linear system has a solution (i.e., that there exists a probability function that satisfies [∆, v] ) and thus its solution set is non-empty. Notice that the set of solutions of the system needs to contain rational solutions given the nature of its linear constraints and the form of the intervals in I r . Thus we can conclude that if a probability function satisfies [∆, v] then there has to exist a rational probability function that satisfies [∆, v] .
For the next proposition let [∆, v] ∈ PK be as follows:
• φ, θ ∈ L for all φ|θ ∈ ∆.
• [∆, v] is, as a directed graph, acyclic.
• v(φ|θ) ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q, for all φ|θ ∈ ∆.
Proof. By Lemma 27 the pair [∆, v] will be satisfiable if and only if it has a model. We aim at constructing a model of [∆, v] .
Let C = {v(φ|θ) | (φ|θ) ∈ ∆}. By assumption on [∆, v], C will be a set of rational values. Let Q be the least commom multiple of the denominators of all the values in C.
For the construction of I we consider first the set of nodes in [∆, v] that have no parents, when dealing with [∆, v] as a graph. Let p be a node in [∆, v] with no parents. We set a collection of Q elements for p, labelled
At the n th step in the construction of I we select a node q in [∆, v] , with parents q 1 , ..., q k (for some k ∈ N) and assume, without loss of generality, that the sets D q1 , ..., D q k have been defined at a previous step. We set a collection of Q(
}, for q. We impose some restrictions on the sets of the form D p , for p ∈ L. We construct I in a way that, for p, q ∈ L, D p ∩ D q = ∅ if and only if one of p|q, q|p is in ∆ or there exists r ∈ L such that p|r, q|r ∈ ∆.
8 That this can be achieved is clear given the restrictions on the cardinality of such sets and the fact that v(φ|θ) is at most
For p ∈ L, with parents q 1 , ..., q k (for some k ∈ N) and sets D q1 , ..., D q k already defined, we will set D p to have exactly |D qi |v(p|q i ) elements of D qi , for each i ∈ {1, ..., k}. The elements of D qi chosen for D p could also be elements of D qj , for j ∈ {1, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ..., k}, (depending on whether q i and q j are related in ∆ by a conditional statement or not) but of no other sets thus far defined. That a suitable definition of D p can be achieved (considering that the sets D q1 , ..., D q k might not be pairwise disjoint) is clear given the restrictions on the cardinality of such sets and the fact that
Proof. We know from results in [12] that Φ CB is inconsistent and thus that
e., at least ). On the other hand Φ CB is, when regarded as a graph, acyclic and with nodes in L. Replacing 0 and 1 by any values in (0, 1) ∩ Q as close as desired to 0 and 1 in rules of the form q|p, 0 , q|p, 1 ∈ Φ CB respectively guarantees satisfiability, by Proposition 28. Therefore we can conclude that DC p (Φ CB ) = for all p ∈ [1, ∞].
Proposition 29 tells us that the amount of inconsistency in Φ CB , as measured by DC p , is infinitesimal and thus Φ CB is very close to consistency (i.e., almost consistent).
By considering the notion of satisfiability taken in [17] (which differs from that based on Definition 3 in that a probability function ω on L with ω(θ) = 0 is assumed to satisfy any statement of the form φ|θ, Ω , for φ|θ ∈ K and Ω ∈ I) we would have that Φ CB is satisfiable (for example, one can consider a probability function ω on L such that ω(¬p 1 ∧ ... ∧ ¬p l ) = 1, which satisfies Φ CB ). Thus the amount of inconsistency in Φ CB according to the metric presented in [17] would be zero. Certainly, in terms of magnitude, there is not much of a difference between the metric presented in [17] and that given by DC p when it comes to quantifying the amount of inconsistency of Φ CB (in magnitude, such difference is just infinitesimal ).
In order to see in more detail the difference between these two approaches (i.e., that in [17] and ours) let us consider a small fragment of Φ CB , given by the following subset of rules: Φ = { D21|S1022, 1 , D20|S1022, 0.1 , D20|D21, 1 }, with D20, D21 ∈ D and S1022 ∈ S.
By considering the notion of satisfiability derived from Definition 3 Φ is unsatisfiable (actually, Φ is a minimal unsatisfiable subset) and DC p (Φ) = whereas according to the notion of satisfiability in [17] Φ is satisfiable (for example, consider the probability distribution ω on {D21, S1022, D20} such that ω(¬D21 ∧ ¬D20 ∧ ¬S1022) = 1, which would correspond, in set theoretical or first order terms, to the empty model ). Beyond magnitudes or degrees of inconsistency, it is important to appreciate the qualitative difference between these two approaches for our particular example. DC p acknowledges the unsatisfiability of Φ (and, we believe, modelers would agree in that Φ should be regarded as unsatisfiable and thus as non-desirable) whereas the approach in [17] does not.
Let us assume now that the conditional D20|D21 is regarded as well evaluated (i.e., that D20|D21, 1 is regarded by the modeler as a reliable piece of information). We will have in this case that DC 1 Γ (Φ) = 0.9 (witn normalized measure DC 1 Γ (Φ) = 0.3), where Γ = {D20|D21}, and thus that there is a considerable difference between our approach and that of [17] also in terms of magnitude in this particular example.
Conclusion
We have presented and analyzed a family of measures (p-measures) aimed at helping the modeler in evaluating inconsistency in probabilistic knowledge bases. Unlike most approaches to measuring inconsistency in the literature, ours is graded in the sense that we take into account minimal adjustments in the degrees of uncertainty (i.e., probabilities) that make the knowledge base consistent. We have also seen that the computation of the measures here presented yield possible repairs to bring or restore consistency in such knowledge bases.
There is still much left to be done in relation to the family of measures presented here. In particular, a deeper understanding of the differences among distinct p-measures (and, by extension, among the possible repairs they yield), both on theoretical and practical grounds, would be desirable. This task is left for future work and, hopefully, will constitute the core of a future paper.
